Abstract. Employing new archival sources, this article reappraises the role of human rights in the opposition to Brazil's repressive military regime. While most interpretations pinpoint the protest against the  murder of journalist Vladimir Herzog as the opposition's great awakening, this research focuses on a similar outcry against the  killing of University of Sa4 o Paulo student Alexandre Vannucchi Leme. His death led students and clergymen to defy riot troops and gather , people for a memorial service that was the first large-scale anti-regime demonstration of the s and a decisive step in the Roman Catholic Church's development as leader of the opposition.
interpretations pinpoint a momentous religious protest against the torturous murder of journalist Vladimir Herzog in  as the opposition's great awakening in the fight for human rights and democracy. In the words of fellow journalist and torture victim Paulo Markun, ' The death of Vladimir Herzog changed Brazil. It provoked the first great popular reaction against torture, arbitrary imprisonment, [and] disrespect for human rights.'# However, this incident occurred after violence and repression had dropped sharply ; indeed, President Ernesto Geisel (-) had already moved to liberalise the regime and restrict the repressive forces. This article reappraises the role of human rights in the opposition by focusing on an earlier, similar protest against the killing of Alexandre Vannucchi Leme, a -year-old student at the University of Sa4 o Paulo. Leme died in jail on  March , hours after his arrest and torture by security agents. One of the most shocking episodes of the term of President Emı! lio Garrastazu! Me! dici (-), his death led students and Roman Catholic clergymen to defy riot troops and gather , people to hear the archbishop of Sa4 o Paulo criticise the government at a memorial service. This case is generally forgotten in discussions of military Brazil,$ yet as the truly first large-scale anti-regime demonstration of the s it set a precedent for the key Herzog protest and helped raise the Church to its decisive leadership of the opposition.
This article examines three facets of the Leme case in order to understand the political stakes involved in the battle between repression and human rights. However, it goes beyond mere political analysis and is also aimed at helping to construct the history of the Me! dici years, the bloodiest yet least studied of the military periods.% The intention is to provide a balanced, interpretive narrative of one of its key moments. The routine detention of a student activist escalated into murder and cover-up by the security forces and a political problem for the regime, which had cowed the opposition into silence since . The first section of the article introduces the dispute over the incident, and seeks to clarify controversial questions about Leme's political activities and the circumstances of his death, including the behaviour of the security forces. In the s censorship and Cold War polarisation distorted or hid the facts about conflict over the repression. Historical rigour demands rectifying the record. This will sharpen interpretations, build appreciation for historical complexities, and allow academic and political debates about the period to mature. It should also help us to understand how different interests create different images of important individuals : the regime saw Leme as a dangerous terrorist, while the opposition raised him up as a symbol of heroic resistance. The second section analyses reactions to the incident and its role in building up the opposition. The Church walked a tightrope between the desire for justice and the need to avoid further violence. It faced high risks in taking up the Leme cause, for instance, reprisal by the military for becoming too close to the revolutionary left, the principal enemy of the regime. Yet it also gained political strength by firmly defending human rights. The third part delves into the Church-military debate of the case. Meeting secretly with a top general, the key bishops pressured the military to investigate the Leme case. Both the general literature on the military regime and the more specialised works on the Brazilian Church correctly emphasise the conflict of the military period, but fail to consider attempts to resolve it through dialogue.& This article explores four major, largely unstudied archival sources indispensable for understanding the Me! dici era. The ' Brasil : Nunca Mais ' collection of military tribunal proceedings against alleged subversives contains a three-volume transcript of the Leme investigation. These records exist thanks to the Archdiocese of Sa4 o Paulo's secret project to copy military trial records. It resulted in the most compelling account of torture in authoritarian Latin America, the best- collection is one of the few primary sources from a major military figure of the period. Each collection offers a rare glimpse of the regime's internal discourse on the Church, and of its strategies for dealing with the clergy. These archives have been supplemented through oral interviews with clergymen, military officers, friends and relatives of Leme, former militants, and others close to the case.
Upon seizing power in  the armed forces applied a US-backed national security plan to make Brazil a strategic bulwark of ' Western Christian civilisation ' against the international Communist movement, which had gained a toehold in the hemisphere with the Cuban Revolution. The entire Brazilian left, ranging from nationalist populists such as deposed President Joa4 o Goulart to radical revolutionaries, became victims of a violent, Brazilian version of McCarthyism. Military takeover followed in other countries, until virtually all of Latin America came under military rule in the s. In Brazil the military and the police arrested , people for political reasons in the period -. Thousands more went into exile. The repression cut deeply into the middle class, normally exempt from state violence.
Campus activism mushroomed in the s, leading students to become the military's most highly targeted group."! The government banned the Uniag o Nacional dos Estudantes ; troops occupied campuses ; and agents hunted down suspected student subversives. In  thousands of student demonstrators, encouraged by the international student activism of that year, called for an end of the status quo. In December the military issued the fifth in a series of Institutional Acts (AI-). AI- closed Congress, suspended civil liberties, and gave the security forces carte blanche to wipe out subversion. Press censorship followed. The revolutionary left tried to topple the government through guerrilla warfare : kidnappings, bombings, assaults on banks and military installations, and other violent actions. Students and other youths made up most recruits. Many joined the Açag o Libertadora Nacional (ALN), a nationalist offshoot of the Communist Party and the principal attempt to build an urban guerilla movement in Brazil.
Brazil on both sides. Security agents tortured thousands of politial prisoners to extract information and to intimidate the populace. In late  the Sa4 o Paulo police ambushed and killed ALN founder Carlos Marighela after the group participated in the abduction of the US ambassador. The police implicated and imprisoned pro-ALN Dominican priests. In  Marighela's successor was tortured to death. By  the revolutionary left was crushed by a campaign most observers considered overkill. "" The bishops generally welcomed the coup as salvation from Communism, considered the antithesis of Christianity. They remained largely silent as Catholic radicals were arrested and tortured. Many even doubted that abuses existed."# However, at the historic Second Vatican Council (-) Catholicism embraced human rights and social justice for the poor, leading many Latin American bishops to call for radical social change. Even before Vatican II a small group of Brazilian progressives started to question the Church's traditional ties to the elite. As the military deepened the repression it targeted the Church as a nest of subversion. In , for instance, an anti-Communist group murdered a priest who worked for Dom He! lder Ca# mara, the leading progressive bishop and a government critic. Because of such incidents, the Church started to denounce torture and violence. Power shifted to the progressives, and most bishops endorsed human rights and criticism of the government's highly inegalitarian economic policies. In the early s the Church stood as the only institution able to contest the regime."$ The Church asserted that he was torturously murdered. Students, lawyers for the family and clergymen pointed out faults in the police version, and in due course obtained decisive proof of death by torture. How they did so is told below. Suffice it to say here that the police version immediately raised suspicions. It was not the first time, nor the last, that they used stories of accidents, suicide and gunfights to explain the death of political prisoners. The best known example would be Herzog's subsequent, clumsily forged hanging after a few hours in jail. Moreover, despite government denials, torture was no secret. Furthermore, the police had prevented examination of Leme's body for signs of abuse by quickly burying it in a pauper's cemetery and covering it with lime to speed decomposition."' (The security forces used this cemetery, located on the outskirts in Perus, to hide the bodies of other political prisoners."() After days of frantic searching for his son at police stations, the army, and then the morgue, Jose! de Oliveira Leme learned of Alexandre's interment from detective Se! rgio Paranhos Fleury, the notorious torturer who netted Marighela.") Egle Maria Vannucchi Leme, Alexandre's mother, went to Perus, where a grounds keeper showed her the plot."*
The police evidence provides some clues about unexplained aspects of Leme's death. As in many cases, they relied heavily on depositions taken under torture, and in the absence of legal counsel. Mainly USP students and friends of Leme, these witnesses later retracted their statements before a military tribunal, where lawyers were present.#! However, police lies and abuse do not invalidate all of their evidence.#" A critical reading of their version raises important questions for understanding the gravity of the case and its political implications.
A major question involves Leme's participation in the ALN. According to the police, Leme was the ALN's ' brain ' at USP. He politicised students, distributed newspapers and recruited sympathisers. Leme hailed Church denunciations of regime abuses and allegedly contacted ' priests ready for engagement in the ALN '.## . In May  the police took several photographs of Leme's grave. The photos have no accompanying documentation. We can speculate that the controversy surrounding Leme's death caused the security forces to take this precautionary measure to be able to detect any tampering with the grave. See AESP, DEOPS-SP, series ' Dossie# s ', doc. no. Z\\. #! For retractions, see Superior Tribunal Militar, Apelaça4 o ., AEL, BNM, case no.
, vol. , pp. -, -, . #" Along these lines, historian and victimised revolutionary Jacob Gorender makes an important point about torture : ' Torture did not bring out only false confessions, which was the argument of the defense lawyers. Most depositions wrenched out under torture contained, amongst the untrue parts, information useful to the police repression ' ; Gorender, Combate nas trevas, p. . Torture could also be used to legitimise information from unknown sources, for example, protected informants. ## Superior Tribunal Militar, Apelaça4 o ., AEL, BNM, case no. , vol. , pp. A, E, H, -, vol. , pp. , , , .
Indeed, Leme was in fact an ALN political coordinator. As the police claimed, he had close contact with ALN guerrilla Ronaldo Queiroz, who had praised Leme's political skills.#$ In mid- Leme had a key meeting with a top leader of the armed wing, Carlos Euge# nio Sarmento Coelho da Paz, a tough, army-trained gunman who eluded the security forces. Leme and Paz discussed ALN political strategy as they sat in a getaway car. Leme was a crucial tie to the outside world for the increasingly isolated revolutionaries. After the ALN's devastating defeats, Paz looked to him to raise the badly needed student recruits, and membership rose. Leme reported to Paz that disgust with the regime was growing on campus and in the Church. Marighela had included the Church in his plan to unite a variety of social groups in the fight for national liberation against the military and US imperialism. With its nationwide presence the Church could provide an excellent support network. After the de! ba# cle of  over the Dominicans, the ALN counted on Leme to renew ties to Catholic progressives. Although Leme's support for ALN took the form of legal activities, he endorsed armed struggle. His death dealt a serious blow to the organisation.#% A flyer of the revolutionary student, the police showed no proof linking Leme to violence. First, their reports did not mention him in a description of robberies and thefts allegedly carried out by Queiroz and others.#' Secondly, although detective Edsel Magnotti, the lead DEOPS-SP interrogator in the case of the Portuguese restaurateur, Oliveira, cited documents found on victim's ALN assassins linking Leme to the crime,#( these documents are nowhere to be found in the DEOPS-SP papers or in the investigation. Moreover, it was unlikely for a guerrilla to carry information that could endanger a comrade. Thirdly, Paz, who ordered the execution, gave the task of shadowing Oliveira not to Leme, but to Francisco Penteado. The ALN could not afford to expose a valuable student organiser to violence.#) Penteado allegedly participated in the assassination in February , and died along with two other militants in a shootout with the police days before Leme's arrest.#* Most significantly, the DEOPS-SP archive contains nothing on Leme prior to his death. The vast documentation of the political police testifies to their careful surveillance even of unthreatening groups and individuals. Leme was apparently too unimportant, or too unnoticeable in his peaceful ALN work, to attract police attention.$! Exactly how the security forces learned of Leme and arrested him remains a mystery. They probably heard word of him in a furious sweep against the ALN for its assassination on  February of Octa! vio Gonçalves Moreira Ju! nior, a torturer at the Second Army's infamous DOI-CODI. The army created the Destacamento de Operaçog es de Informaçog es and the Centro de Operaçog es de Defesa Interna to fight guerrillas. Its ranks included policemen such as Moreira Ju! nior,$" who also had links to the #' The student was Alberto Alonso La! zaro ; in an interview (see note ) Alonso denied the information attributed to him. On his testimony and the other crimes, see Superior Tribunal Militar, Apelaça4 o ., AEL, BNM, case no. information, Leme refused. According to witnesses, Leme, carried by jailkeepers back to his cell after a torture session, cried out, ' My name is Alexandre Vannucchi Leme. I am a geology student. They accuse me of belonging to the ALN. I only gave my name.'%$ One DOI-CODI man referred to Leme as ' crazy '.%% A friend who was also imprisoned and tortured stated the following : ' The torturers were very impressed because he didn't say anything … . They would become enraged when we said that he was a Christian. They wanted to talk about Alexandre … . Their concern was always to incriminate Alexandre, to create the image of an atheist, a sectarian, a violent person. But that image didn't fit with the one that we had of him.'%& Whatever the reason, the DOI-CODI agents were unprepared for Leme's death. They rushed to forge two stories. The first was for those who knew that Leme died at DOI-CODI : prisoners, agents uninvolved in the interrogation, coroners who signed false reports and other police authorities. In this version Leme had committed suicide by cutting his throat with a razor blade in the infirmary. To authenticate this story the interrogators and their commanders slit the neck from ear to ear while the body still lay in the cell. Other prisoners saw the body covered with blood as the agents dragged it away.%' The jailors then faked a search for blades in other cells.%( The second version, the truck accident, went to the press. It became imperative after a USP student phoned the family about the arrest, leading Jose! Leme to search for his son. The security agents could not keep the stories straight. Fleury gave Leme's father the accident version, while moments later Magnotti insisted it was suicide.%) In a letter to a top prosecutor DEOPS-SP Director Lu! cio Vieira mixed the two versions by referring to the truck accident as a ' suicide '.%* After the press belatedly reported the ' accident ' on  March, a DOI-CODI man bragged to prisoners : ' We give out any version we want. '&! Cover-up accusations allowed the regime to focus attention on Leme as a dangerous ' terrorist '. The incident's political implications led the police to justify Leme's death by investigating him posthumously. Magnotti wrote his superior explaining Leme's inclusion in the Oliveira murder case only after the family's lawyers petitioned the courts for aid.&" In his case summary Magnotti revealed the underlying concern of the regime : students and the Church were protesting Leme's death.&# The official public statement extended the lie by accusing Leme of crimes not even alleged by the police. The public statement also referred to Leme's revelation of the names of other subversives,&$ but no such deposition exists in the police report.
The reaction to Leme's death : moving to the brink, building opposition
Leme posed a bigger challenge to the regime in death than in life.
As the military muffled all opposition, the Church became the ' voice of the voiceless '. The most authoritative statements came from the ConfereV ncia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB, or National Conference of the Bishops of Brazil), whose periodic assemblies united the country's  bishops to deliberate on pastoral and political issues. After  the CNBB increasingly criticised the regime's abuses and economic policies in a series of official documents. In February  the bishops commemorated the th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and adopted an unprecedented educational campaign by distributing hundreds of thousands of copies of the declaration.&% A month later the death of Leme tested the bishops' commitment. The Church and the students protested the incident not just because Leme was a popular campus leader. Significantly, his was the only death of a USP activist who had not gone underground to join the guerrillas. There was no link between Leme and violence. Therefore, the opposition was all the more adamant about learning the circumstances of his demise. Leme's death also contributed to the growing perception among the students and in the Church that the repression had reached its limits. Leme became a symbol against the repression.
The first outcry came from the bishop of Sorocaba. Dom Jose! Melhado Campos, who was a neighbour of the Lemes, and the local council of priests issued a scathing criticism of the police. It was read at Masses and published in the Sorocaba press, Church bulletins and O Sag o Paulo, the weekly newspaper of the Archdiocese of Sa4 o Paulo :
Why wasn't the family notified of the ' accident ' ? Why wasn't the body turned over to them ? Who in the family carried out the proper identification of the cadaver before it was buried ? Why did the family only learn about the occurrence in the newspapers, on Friday the rd, when, according to police, Alexandre had died the previous Saturday, the th ? … It does not lie within our competence to refute the accusations imputed against this young university student. God knows the truth, and judges. But it is evident that, torturing and killing the victim, the police authorities barbarically eliminated someone who could have recognised his acts and defended himself through the legal process.&& Several days later Dom Jose! and the priests' council published another protest in the local paper. They based their action on the CNBB's February document. They also asked President Me! dici to improve the protection of human rights.&' These statements challenged the regime. However, they did not reveal the tensions behind Dom Jose! 's decision to speak out. He did not hesitate to take strong positions, for instance, by defending workers' causes on May Day.&( But, like most bishops, Dom Jose! staunchly opposed Communism. He became caught between the two extremes of the era, causing some radical priests to view him as ' pusillanimous ' in taking a stance. These priests convinced Dom Jose! to denounce the Leme incident.&) In fact, the first statement was not written by Dom Jose! nor the priests' council, but by Father Vannucchi. His first draft aggressively demanded justice. As a concession to conservatives on the council, he softened the final draft by leaving open the question of Leme's involvement in subversive activities. To give the manifesto greater credibility Vannucchi did not sign it.&* As letters of support came from abroad, Dom Jose! felt vindicated in issuing the statements.'! Meanwhile, students at USP and other universities protested Leme's death. In late March and April USP buzzed with activity with meetings, pamphleteering, discussion at information tables, and class stoppages. Students wore black arm bands and draped black banners around the campus.'" Leme's geology colleagues organised a joint student-faculty committee to investigate the circumstances of the death, and to establish proof of his innocence.'# Students from USP and other schools then issued a statement citing Leme's ' excellent reputation among students and professors ' and his qualities as a leader.
This was a clandestine arrest, without any written order from the competent authority, innumerable instances of which have occurred in this country. Therefore, it constitutes gross arbitrariness and is a clear violation of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, which Brazil had adhered to … . The running over of political prisoners has occurred with such surprising frequency that the veracity of [the police] account becomes questionable.'$ The geology students declared a state of mourning, and proposed a memorial mass for Leme. The police monitored the students through an infiltrator and obtained copies of their manifestos.'% The clergy also planned masses. On  March Dom Jose! held one in Sorocaba. Another was set for  March in Sa4 o Paulo.
How to carry it out was a delicate matter. ') Emotions rising, the Leme issue threatened to burst into a major crisis. Dom Paulo had to work carefully. He was archbishop of South America's largest city, and an honorary vice-president of Brazil. To celebrate mass for a suspected subversive could only anger the authorities. But Dom Paulo was also a pastor to students. Twenty-two of their leaders went to Dom Paulo's home. They informed him that the police had surrounded the USP. The leaders demanded that he say mass there for , students expected to appear. If not, they would start a riot. However, going to USP could only further provoke the generals. Dom Paulo sought a non-violent alternative. He convinced the students that a mass at the Se! Cathedral in downtown Sa4 o Paulo would be an act for all Brazil to witness.'* On the eve of the ninth anniversary of the coup, and despite the censors' ban on publicity and the presence of riot troops near the Se! and at USP, , people attended the service. Upon entering the cathedral each received a prayer sheet that also served to cover the face from police Only God owns life. He is its origin, and only He can decide its end … . When he was born, Christ himself wanted to feel the tenderness of his mother and the warmth of the family. And even after he died, his corpse was returned to his mother, friends, and relatives. This justice was done to Christ by a representative of the Roman government who was totally against His mission as the Messiah … . ' Where is your brother ? The voice of your brother's blood is crying out to Me from the ground ! '… Who has done justice -the Supreme Judge asks -who has seen to it that the truth is said and that love has been given a chance ? … Men are being imprisoned ! Has anybody been able to visit them and free them ?($ After the mass the people sang and calmly left the cathedral as the security forces stood by in a -block area ready to repress any attempt at political demonstration. Not all students and clergy supported Dom Paulo. Dom Vicente Marcheti Zioni, the conservative archbishop whose arrival in Botucatu led to the exit of many clergymen, refused a request by students to say mass. ' ridiculous '. It concluded : ' Heads are going to roll, and you can be sure that they won't be ours.'(& An exchange of private letters between Dom Paulo and Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho revealed the extremes to which each side believed the other had gone. Dom Paulo complained that the security forces took ' justice into their own hands ' and were ignorant of ' the most elemental principles of human rights '. ' A crime -if it occurred -is not punished with an even larger crime,' Dom Paulo added. He continued :
Your Excellency, Senhor Minister, knows as well as I do what Brazil expects from its youth … to whom lessons of this ilk, especially coming from where they do, are not the most apt for making this generation believe in the future or be ready to take charge of it. Whatever its source, violence is the most fertile seed from whose bosom hate will be born many times over and whose brutality and stupidity prepare the ruin of any nation. Violence is even more serious, incomprehensible, and unpardonable if it begins precisely with those whose highest mission is to safeguard the peace, protect families, and show tolerance and understanding towards those on whom age has not yet conferred maturity, and who often confuse healthy ideals with the impetuous generosity of their young years … . There once was a time when having a son in the university was reason for just pride and serene tranquility for parents. Today with ever greater frequency it is motive for fear and anxiety.
Dom Paulo asked Passarinho to use his prestige within the government to clarify the many doubts about the case.(' Passarinho's response was severe. He claimed that the episode did not concern the Ministry of Education (although DEOPS documentation showed that its spy service watched the situation at the USP((). Leme died because he was trying to overthrow the regime. ' Alexandre was a student terrorist … . He belonged to the Armed Tactical Group of the ALN, whose mission, as is known, is armed combat. He was not affected as a student, but as a terrorist.' Passarinho then attacked the Church's human rights campaign.
Eminence, I cannot fathom a justice (I prefer to call it a pretence of justice) which consists only of invoking … defence of the prerogatives of human beings when they are guerrillas. I do not understand why nothing is said about the right to life of people like the Portuguese merchant, machine-gunned thanks to information from Alexandre and others.
Passarinho praised Dom Paulo's denunciation of violence, and urged him to defend his position publicly, but he criticised the cardinal for holding the memorial.
That mass, celebrated … when the day's activities are coming to an end and crowds become inevitable in downtown Sa4 o Paulo ; a mass awaited with intense expectation because of activists' publicity spread as a challenge to the temporal Power ; a mass marked by a homily extremely harsh towards those responsible for state security (and therefore judging them in absentia) ; that mass, Senhor Cardinal, could have caused a river of blood, and yes, this time, the blood of the innocent and the pious ! Fortunately, thanks to the Mercy of God and the prudence of the authorities, this did not happen. But the probability was extremely high. I believe that Your Excellency considered that possibility but preferred to run the risk for reasons surely ponderable, but beyond me.()
The government reacted strongly. Censors blocked news of Dom Paulo's sermon,(* although some reports did slip through, resulting in the punishment of a Sa4 o Paulo television station under the National Security Law, and prior censorship of the Rio opposition weekly Opiniag o.)! In the Chamber of Deputies Congressman Lysa# neas Maciel berated the government, but no newspaper printed his speech or the demand of a colleague that the Congress investigate human rights violations.)" The security forces arrested dozens in a search for the campus organisers of the event. Students were also detained in Rio de Janeiro.)# The episode reverberated across the state of Sa4 o Paulo, keeping the DEOPS and intelligence units on alert for months. In an unusual development President Me! dici's public relations office received a notice about the case. Like Communism, mention of Leme's name immediately raised suspicions and led to the opening of intelligence files on individuals.)$ As one report put it, the regime now had an ' Alexandre Vannucc[h]i Leme problem '.)% The government feared, and the campuses hoped for, one thing : the revival of the student movement. The mass was the first large political gathering of students since .)& One flyer stated that it showed the ' force of mobilisation and unity, which leave the repressors with their hands tied ' against the masses.)' Another called the demonstrations ' a firm and clear act of repudiation ' against the government's repressive measures.)( The spy services in Rio de Janeiro and across Sa4 o Paulo analysed the ' fresh outbreak of leftist activities ' at colleges and schools, some experiencing agitation for the first time. Activists were organising meetings, strikes, marches, and murals ; distributing literature ; and seeking ties to the progressive clergy.)) In Sa4 o Carlos students started a petition for the exhumation of Leme's body.)* Fearing the spread of Communist influence, the Polı! cia Federal saw the need for all spy agencies to ' conduct a general investigation of the entire student movement '.*!
The Bipartite Commission : pressure behind the scenes
In the weeks after Leme's death the opposition continued to pressure the government to resolve the case. Responding to faculty and student demands, USP President Miguel Reale sent a laconic, formal request for an explanation to Brigadier General Se! rvulo Mota Lima, the Secretary of Public Security for the state of Sa4 o Paulo.*"
In an attempt to erase all suspicion of wrongdoing, General Lima publicly replied to Reale. The statement appeared widely in the press. Lima reaffirmed the accusations as well as the accident story. He added that Leme had revealed names of other ALN members and confessed participating in two robberies and the Oliveira murder. However, Leme had refused to state his occupation or his address, where he kept subversive documents. Moreover, Lima asserted that the security forces delayed public notification because they needed secrecy to break up a ' terrorist cell ' at the USP. Lima claimed he had witnesses to prove that Leme died from an accident. The burial took place quickly to prevent what had happened in Recife, where ' terrorists ' tried to steal a comrade's cadaver from the morgue to exploit his death politically.*# As the secret Bipartite meeting subsequently revealed, the military feared that Leme would become another Edson Luı! s, a student victim of the repression whose publicly displayed corpse inspired nationwide protests in .*$ After Lima's statement the Leme family and the Church opened another front. Ma! rio de Passos Simas and Jose! Carlos Dias, lawyers for the Sa4 o Paulo Peace and Justice Commission, petitioned the police, the courts and the military to turn over the body and to investigate the incident thoroughly. Simas obtained the support of the Sa4 o Paulo branch of the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil. He pointed out errors in the government version, for example, the lack of a normally routine investigation of the truck accident. The requests went up the chain of command to General Mello.*% His failure to respond or to send the case to the civilian authorities signified implicit recognition that the death had occurred in a military installation (DOI-CODI).*& The episode gained international dimensions when Leme's mother wrote a letter to Pope Paul VI on Good Friday, the day of Christ's death. ' My son Alexandre, who was a person of ideals and self-giving, was summarily assassinated by the organs of repression exactly because he was struggling for the protection of human rights in Brazil and defending justice and liberty,' she wrote. She asked the Pontiff to help bring ' peace and justice ' to Brazil.*' The bishops of Sa4 o Paulo had the message delivered directly to the Pope.*( The foreign press also reported on the case.*) Such negative publicity worried the regime. The Pope had already criticised the government because of torture. As a result, the military pressed the Church to stop denouncing human rights violations. Ironically, torture itself was used in the attempt to discover the sources of news about it.** When all else failed, a group of Brazil's leading bishops took the Leme case to the Bipartite Commission While Church and state seemingly headed on a collision course in the early s, the Bipartite demonstrated that the two sides also made a serious attempt at systematic dialogue. It was an important and rare channel of communication. The Bipartite sought to preserve traditional Churchstate harmony, and it avoided a number of serious clashes over national security policy and social justice. As the repression deepened the Bipartite's focus shifted to disputes over human rights violations. The Church pressed Muricy and the Situaçag o for explanations of numerous cases. The military helped locate some detainees, but it also upheld the accusations of subversion against political prisoners. While Dom Paulo and others in the Church denounced abuses publicly, the Grupo Religioso worked privately."!! The Leme incident was the climax of the Bipartite's efforts.
The Grupo Religioso persistently pressed the Situaçag o for an accounting of Leme's death. At the  May meeting Candido Mendes described the moment as an important ' test ' of the Bipartite's dialogue."!" He presented the petitions from the Leme family drafted by Dias and Simas. The attorneys enumerated inconsistencies in the official version, including the claim that Leme was buried as an anonymous indigent because nothing was known of him. The death certificate carried full information. The petitioners requested an exhumation and a detailed autopsy in the presence of the family's doctor, dentist and lawyers. They explained that their motive was not political but to ' discover the truth '."!# General Muricy declared that the government wanted to clarify the incident. However, Major Leone da Silveira Lee of the Centro de Informaçog es do ExeT rcito (CIE), a unit largely responsible for the destruction of the guerrillas, attempted to rebut the petition point by point using the same argumentation as General Lima. He denied that the security forces knew that either Leme or those he allegedly denounced were students. Moreover, there was ' nothing strange ' about the truck accident. Most significantly, Lee said that the time, place, and circumstances of Leme's arrest were unimportant."!$ Candido Mendes insisted that the government bear upon the judiciary to approve the petition, but Padilha refused the "!! For a detailed discussion of the Bipartite, see Serbin, ' Social Justice or Subversion ? ' "!" ' Relato! rio idea as a violation of the separation of powers. The Situaçag o's post-meeting report stated that the Leme case ' polarised ' the two sides. Yet the military was confident that its version would eventually be proved correct, thus forcing Dom Jose! and other clergymen to retract their criticisms."!% The Grupo Religioso came well-prepared to counter-argue the military's points at the  July Bipartite. Dom Lucas Moreira Neves, one of Dom Paulo's auxiliary bishops, presented documents verifying Leme's appendectomy in late January and his recuperation in Sorocaba during part of February. This evidence contradicted the security forces' mention of an ' old incision ' on the corpse and the assertion that Leme was engaged in subversive activity in Sa4 o Paulo in February. Thus an exhumation might show the cadaver to be of another person. (As CNBB Secretary General Dom Ivo Lorscheiter observed, the security forces switched the identities of prisoners to prevent their location by friends or family. Dom Jose! had raised this possibility during the Sorocaba mass.) Dom Lucas also revealed that Leme's family was receiving threatening phone calls. Candido Mendes added that the petition stood valid not only for the civilian justice system, but the military courts that judged cases of alleged subversion. General Muricy tried to deflect these arguments. The family had not approached the army with its petition, he stated. The case was ' practically closed ', but Candido Mendes was ' pressuring ' the Lemes to continue. The bishops forced the issue yet further, with Dom Ivo defending Candido Mendes. Even the more conciliatory Dom Avelar Branda4 o Vilela, the CNBB vice-president and primate of Brazil, entered the debate, affirming that ' this case should be carried to its ultimate consequences … because it involved the probity of the CNBB and the bishop of Sorocaba '."!& Dom Lucas then dropped a bombshell : another prisoner would testify that Leme had died differently from the military version. Candido Mendes suggested that attorney Simas be brought to the Bipartite. General Muricy refused, stating that Simas was ' against the government '. He preferred a member of the Leme family. Padilha added that the family had given up on its petition."!' (In fact, it had not.) But the evidence continued to mount against the Situaçag o. At the August Bipartite Dom Ivo showed the commission the depositions of five witnesses stating in a military court that Leme had died in his cell after torture by DOI-CODI agents."!( Dom Ivo's words were the last recorded by the Bipartite on the Leme death. As it predicted, the military had won a battle against the Grupo Religioso because the official version stood. No body was exhumed, no satisfaction or further explanation given the family and the public. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Situaçag o took part in the cover-up. Yet in its estimation the bishops had persisted because the case was ' polemical ' and thus gave them ' certain triumphs '."!)
The ultimate moral victory came for the Church in , when it published testimony about Leme's death in Brasil : Nunca Mais. One eyewitness at the DOI-CODI spoke of seeing ' many people being tortured '. ' The worst case took place with a young man named Alexandre Vannucchi. For two or three days I heard his cries and, in the end, … I saw his cadaver taken out of the maximum security cell, with blood spreading all over the floor.'"!*
Conclusion
As his death produced repercussions throughout the s, Leme's name became a symbol of resistance for the opposition, but also a signal to record subversive activity in the police registries. In  Amnesty International included a description of Leme's death in its human rights report on Brazil.""! USP's DiretoT rio Central dos Estudantes (DCE) was renamed the ' DCE Alexandre Vannucchi Leme '. In  a group of student representatives at the CNBB assembly, which was debating a key document on the political situation, demanded that the bishops keep human rights as a priority and cited the Leme case to support their argument.""" Leme was remembered again after the security forces invaded the Pontifical Catholic University of Sa4 o Paulo and destroyed its theatre.""# In March  students across Brazil organised a day of protest to commemorate the fifth anniversary of Leme's death and the tenth anniversary of the Edson Luı! s incident. They used the occasion to demonstrate against President Geisel and the visit of US President Jimmy Carter.""$ Leme's parents became rallying points in the broad-based amnesty movement for exiles and political prisoners. With the political opening, a number of opposition candidates tried to recruit the couple to support their campaigns.""% Leme's case also appeared in denunciations of physicians accused of signing false death certificates to hide torture.""& Many of these and other recollections of Leme caught the attention of DEOPS officers. Thus different interpretations of his importance contributed to the creation of the historical memory of the incident. The opposition cast Leme as a martyr, while the police saw him as a dangerous individual who, when remembered, inspired further subversion.
Justice came slowly. Disillusioned with the bishops' subsequent silence on the case, and fearing for his safety, Father Vannucchi left Brazil for Europe in  and quit the ministry. In Switzerland, where information about prisoners was often easier to come by than in Brazil itself, he continued to the search for clues about Leme's fate. ""' In late  the Superior Military Tribunal, which heard all appeals cases involving political prisoners, reviewed testimony of six witnesses to Leme's torture in the DOI-CODI. One of the judges, General Rodrigo Octa! vio Jorda4 o, proposed an investigation, but was outvoted -. Encouraged by Jorda4 o's initiative, attorney Simas once again petitioned the military justice system. He too was denied.""( In , with Brazil clearly headed for civilian rule, the Leme family finally received permission to remove their son's bones from the Perus cemetery. With the help of a dental mould taken in early  two dentists confirmed that the bones were Leme's."") They were buried in the family plot in Sorocaba after a ceremony in Sa4 o Paulo that also welcomed home the remains of Friar Tito de Alencar Lima, a brutally tortured Dominican who committed suicide in France. In December of  President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed into law a bill making government compensation possible for families of victims of the dictatorship. Leme's name was approved as a government commission began reviewing cases in .""* New evidence and the perspective of time have made possible an historical anatomy of the Leme case that helps explain both the Church's evolution as a defender of human rights, and the priorities and modus operandi of the repressive forces. While most people at USP and in the Church primarily viewed Leme as a student and doubted the regime's version of events, the security forces had nevertheless accurately identified him as an important ALN militant. When he unexpectedly died, they resorted to a dual coverup of their botched torture. While clerics and students sought to clarify the incident, the police and the military worked to preserve the image of the regime, which was seriously damaged by denunciations of torture. Protest caused them to justify their actions by falsely magnifying Leme's crimes. The threat posed by Leme in life and especially in death also served as a rationale for increased vigilance of the campuses and, indirectly, for continued support for the intelligence agencies.
Leme's death struck profoundly at the student and ecclesiastical communities, and put the security services on alert for months. The episode was unique. For the first time in four years of all-out war on the left Brazilians gathered en masse to protest torture and death. Clergy and students challenged the repressive system and its leaders at the peak of the violence. The reawakening of civil society against the regime had begun.
The swell of outrage against Leme's death led the Church to exercise its new policies in defence of human rights. It became the ' voice of the voiceless ' for the family and the thousands of mourners prohibited from protesting. The notion of human rights passed from abstraction to concrete action. Dom Jose! 's and Dom Paulo's gestures did not represent individual positions but the national consensus of the bishops. The Church's position was fraught with risks. First, the potential for violence was great. In Rio in  the police did not hesitate to strike against people leaving a memorial mass for Edson Luı! s. Secondly, vigorous defence of human rights caused tensions among the clergy, as illustrated by the examples of Father Vannucchi, the Sorocaba priests' council, and Dom Zioni. Thirdly, the Leme mass identified the Church O Globo,  July , p. . As of September , however, the family still had not received compensation.
with subversion and endangered its historically non-partisan stance. Had it known fully Leme's ALN ties, it might have trodden more cautiously. Paradoxically, the Church's position increased its political strength. As the intelligence services feared, the Leme incident forged a tighter bond between the Church and the students. The growing confluence between the Church and the left laid the basis for a strategic alliance that would help knit together the opposition during the transition to democracy."#! Dom Paulo demonstrated the complexities and tensions involved in building the opposition. He walked a thin line between violence and demands for justice. He went with the students to the brink of confrontation with the government, but, unbeknownst to the regime, he also played a moderating role by staying away from the political hotbed of the USP campus and insisting on non-violent protest. Dom Paulo understood well how to test the limits of the generals' patience. He was prudent but firm in his opposition against the repression. The Leme protest removed any doubt that he might be coopted. It was a defining moment for Dom Paulo and the Church. Keeping the institution intact, he skillfully manoeuvred it into opposition.
The Leme mass served as a key rehearsal for Dom Paulo's highly important ecumenical memorial service for well-known Jewish journalist Herzog in . This protest presented an even greater challenge to the regime because it united the opposition -not only students and Catholic clergymen, but Jews, media professionals, intellectuals and other members of the elite. Thirty thousand students at USP went on strike, and  bishops signed a statement denouncing the regime's violence. Two rabbis and a Protestant minister helped preside over the memorial at the cathedral, which drew , people despite the authorities' attempts to prevent the event. Dom He! lder, a pariah of the regime, also attended. The Herzog death came after Giesel had created new expectations about the end of the repression. Indeed, by then the regime had begun to use repression more selectively, a result of Me! dici's effective stifling of the opposition. The debate over the case took place in public. The censors, for instance, did not stop a thousand journalists from publishing a petition in newspapers demanding an investigation. Herzog's status as a member of the media elite further magnified the indignation about his death."#" The protest against his death marked a turning point in the struggle for democracy. However, two and a half years earlier the Leme mass served as a key precedent by drawing , people in protest during one of the bloodiest moments of the regime and before the Geisel administration's attempts to reduce human rights abuses. The opening of Dom Paulo's Herzog sermon echoed his earlier commentary : ' God owns life.'"## The Leme case did not have greater impact because the regime imposed a big lie about his death. Herzog's colleague Fernando Jorda4 o observed that Dom Paulo had regularly denounced human rights violations throughout the Me! dici years, but ' we journalists, because of pressure from our bosses, selfishness, professional incompetence profissional, or lack of political awareness, often did not cover or make [the denunciations] public.'"#$ Another tension resulted from the Church's confluence with the left. Dom Paulo's embrace of the Leme case and other similar actions by the Church marked a certain bias resulting from the sharp polarisation of Brazilian society. Defenders of the regime complained that human rights often meant defence of the left, but not of its victims. Minister Passarinho expressed this theme to Dom Paulo, and it was also an important subtext of the police investigation of Leme. Officer Magnotti wrote that ' elements of the left in the Catholic Church … who knew how to protest, although without justification, the death of Alexandre Vannucchi Leme, … did not mention a single word in the pulpits of the Church in protest of the barbarous murder carried out by the subversive agents of the ALN against a … simple and humble merchant.'"#% The right, too, suffered losses and held its memorial ceremonies."#& This observation is not to justify the right nor diminish the security forces' barbarism, but to point out the historical constraints on the Church's campaign to introduce basic notions of human rights. Ideological polarisation shaped that campaign and the understanding of human rights in Brazil. Disagreement, distortion and misunderstanding about human rights still abound. A poignant example occurred in , when relatives stated that ' it has become evident that the intention of the Grupo Religioso, in this case led by Prof. Candido Mendes, is to persist in the search for the whereabouts of elements noted as '' pending cases,'' that is, persons that they considered to be desparecidos or fugitives '."$! As one of Candido Mendes's collaborators remembered, the Commission prevented the military from denying knowledge of human rights violations."$" As Candido Mendes himself recalled, the circulation of information about abuses caused an increased ' awareness ' about human rights that preempted further violations. The accumulation of denunciations by the Grupo Religioso and other Church groups helped demonstrate that violence had reached its ' saturation point ', causing Geisel to react against it."$#
The existence of dialogue is usually overlooked in the writings on authoritarianism in Brazil and other Latin American countries. The Bipartite Commission revealed that both the Brazilian Church and the Me! dici administration were somewhat more flexible than previously thought in their approach to each other. Repression and resistance marked the period, but so did the search for a political solution. The Church acted differently according to the setting and historical circumstances of each Latin American regime, ranging from conservative clerics' outright collaboration with the repressive forces in Argentina to different degrees and forms of opposition in countries such as Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil."$$ As a systematic dialogue the Bipartite Commission represented a unique attempt at dealing with human rights violations.
As the military correctly perceived, human rights were a profoundly political question. Both sides were biased. The regime worked to present Leme as a terrorist. The Church used the case to denounce human rights abuses. In fairness to the Church, repression and censorship placed limits on the frequency and manner of its protests. The Church selected its cases well, capitalising on the security forces' clumsy choices of victims and implausible explanations of jailings, disappearances and deaths. The Church took advantage of the opening provided by the Leme case to challenge the repression.
As the authoritarian era fades, the appearance of other primary sources will lead to further reinterpretation and a deepening of our understanding of the period. This process is essential in a post-authoritarian society whose majority learned only the regime's version about individuals such as Leme. Political opening produces a documentary opening which illuminates the past. The most important archives -of the DOI-CODI and the various intelligence services -still remain hidden. The degree to which researchers gain access to these sensitive materials will be an important measure of the commitment to building a lasting democracy in Brazil. Likewise, the refusal of former members of the repressive apparatus to admit mistakes sets a bad example for the Brazilian military and police forces, and undermines civil and human rights.
